California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act continues to generate published and newly reported Court of Appeal decisions with practical consequences for employees, employers, and Civil Rights Department (CRD) investigations. This legal update summarizes seven recently reported FEHA and related employment opinions: Civil Rights Department v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (filed Aug. 11, 2026; certified for partial publication Sept. 9, 2026), Glick v. City of Los Angeles (July 30, 2026), Morales v. Superior Court (Aug. 3, 2026), Smith v. Burbank Unified School District (Oct. 7, 2026), Cruz v. City of Hermosa Beach (Oct. 15, 2026), Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Oct. 5, 2026), and McInerney v. Regents of University of California (Sept. 18, 2026).
Updated October 8, 2026 to add Smith v. Burbank Unified School District, October 20, 2026 to add Cruz v. City of Hermosa Beach, and October 21, 2026 to add Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank and McInerney v. Regents of University of California.
Together, the cases address how far FEHA investigations may reach across state lines, how trial courts may (and may not) cut jury awards for discrimination and retaliation, when a narrow employment arbitration clause leaves FEHA and related claims in court, whether unpaid leave can be a reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religious beliefs, whether a police officer fired under a vaccine mandate is entitled to a POBRA administrative appeal, when an employer is strictly liable for harassment by a supervisor, and how much protection California’s Fair Chance Act gives job applicants with conviction records.
1. CRD v. SpaceX: Out-of-state work does not automatically stop a FEHA investigation
In Civil Rights Department v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., No. B346853 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 3, filed Aug. 11, 2026) 2026 WL 2654677, the Second District affirmed a Los Angeles Superior Court order compelling SpaceX to comply with a CRD investigatory subpoena.
What happened
A former SpaceX employee filed a CRD complaint alleging sex/gender pay and promotion discrimination and retaliation for helping draft and circulate an open letter criticizing the company and its CEO. SpaceX listed a California address on the complaint. The employee had been hired to work in Redmond, Washington. SpaceX objected that CRD lacked power to investigate because FEHA does not apply outside California. CRD first focused discovery on where the alleged conduct occurred, then petitioned the superior court to compel production on the retaliation claim and on remaining jurisdictional facts for the discrimination claims. The trial court granted the petition. SpaceX appealed.
What the Court of Appeal held
The court affirmed. SpaceX did not carry its burden to show that enforcing the subpoena was unconstitutional, barred by the presumption against extraterritorial legislation, or beyond CRD’s FEHA jurisdiction. Key points:
- Constitutional challenges were forfeited. SpaceX’s opening brief offered only a cursory mix of Commerce Clause, due process, full-faith-and-credit, and supremacy arguments, without explaining how an investigatory subpoena to a company with a significant California presence violated any of them. A Fourth Amendment “fishing expedition” argument raised for the first time in the reply brief was also forfeited.
- Extraterritoriality is not a categorical bar. Following Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732, the court treated the question as which California connections trigger the relevant FEHA provisions—not whether any out-of-state effect automatically defeats the statute. Investigatory authority and substantive liability raise separate analyses; fewer connections may suffice to let CRD investigate than to impose liability.
- No blanket “employee must work in California” rule for FEHA. SpaceX argued that FEHA never reaches workers who live and work outside California, relying on wage-and-hour cases such as Tidewater, Sullivan, Ward, and Oman. The court rejected that categorical rule. Those decisions did not involve FEHA, and the Supreme Court has emphasized that each statute must be construed on its own terms.
- The complaint did not prove the claims were purely Washington events. SpaceX overstated the territorial facts. The administrative complaint did not allege that every adverse action occurred exclusively in Washington. CRD pointed to California connections alleged in related litigation, including California-based managers, pay statements issued from California, and California new-hire paperwork. Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1850 was distinguishable because the California connections there were settled and insufficient; here, those facts were still being investigated.
The opinion was later certified for partial publication (no change in the judgment) on September 9, 2026.
Why it matters
Employers with California headquarters, California managers, or California payroll cannot assume that a worker’s out-of-state residence and duty station ends a CRD investigation at the threshold. CRD may use subpoenas to determine whether alleged discrimination or retaliation has a substantial connection to California. Employees who report to California leadership or receive California-sourced pay may have a path to FEHA process even if they physically work elsewhere. The decision does not hold that FEHA always applies to out-of-state workers; it holds that SpaceX failed to show CRD lacked investigatory jurisdiction on this record.
2. Glick v. City of Los Angeles: No artificial cap on “garden-variety” FEHA emotional-distress awards
In Glick v. City of Los Angeles (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 151, the Second District (Division 2) reversed a remittitur that had slashed a FEHA gender-discrimination and retaliation verdict against the City of Los Angeles, and it reinstated the jury’s judgment.
What happened
Two male LAPD officers, Stephen Glick and Alfred Garcia, alleged they were treated more harshly than their female partners after an arrestee claimed unknown officers had defaced him in a holding cell. Internal Affairs seized the male officers’ phones, lockers, and vehicles, benched them from the field while their female partners stayed on patrol, and the chief of police later sought termination-level discipline that was ultimately reduced. A union representative who complained about the disparity was told, in substance, that this was “something guys would do, not females.”
A jury found gender discrimination and retaliation. It awarded Glick about $8.62 million (including $8 million in noneconomic damages and $621,358 in future economic damages) and Garcia $4.5 million in noneconomic damages. The officers had stipulated they were not claiming emotional distress beyond the usual distress associated with the claimed injuries and would not present expert psychiatric testimony. The trial court conditionally granted a new trial unless Glick accepted $250,000 and Garcia accepted $125,000, characterizing the proof as “garden-variety” distress and wiping out Glick’s economic award as speculative.
What the Court of Appeal held
- The officers’ own testimony about stress, family strain, career harm, alcohol relapse, and loss of trust in the department was enough to support the noneconomic awards. Expert testimony is not required for emotional distress within jurors’ common experience.
- The trial court abused its discretion by treating “garden-variety” distress as subject to an unofficial ceiling in the low five- or six-figure range. There is no fixed legal maximum for noneconomic damages, and the awards were not so large as to show passion or prejudice as a matter of law.
- Zeroing Glick’s future economic damages was also an abuse of discretion. The jury heard admissible testimony from Glick that the City’s conduct would cause him to retire earlier than planned, plus expert testimony quantifying that loss at $621,358. The City had even disavowed a challenge to the economic award in its new-trial motion.
The new-trial order was reversed and the original judgment reinstated and affirmed.
Why it matters
Public and private employers defending FEHA verdicts cannot count on a trial judge to recut a large noneconomic award merely because the plaintiff did not call a psychiatrist or labeled the distress “usual.” Plaintiff-side, a stipulation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.320 does not automatically confine a jury to a token number. The decision also underscores that an employee’s own testimony about shortened career plans, if credited, can support future economic damages.
3. Morales v. Superior Court: Narrow arbitration language does not cover FEHA, CFRA, or Tameny claims
Morales v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 239 is now in the official reports. We previously analyzed the writ decision in detail in Morales v. Superior Court: Narrow Arbitration Clauses and FEHA Claims.
In short, Silvia Morales sued San Diego Gas & Electric after a 2024 termination, alleging FEHA disability claims, CFRA retaliation, and a Tameny public-policy claim. The Fourth District (Division 1) held that the later, integrated invention/confidentiality agreement—not the earlier offer letter—controlled, and that a clause covering disputes “regarding any aspect of this Agreement” or alleged violations of the Agreement did not reach statutory and public-policy claims that exist independent of the contract. The court directed the superior court to deny the motion to compel arbitration.
For employees and employers still using older offer letters and invention agreements, wording limited to disputes about the agreement is not a broad employment-arbitration clause.
4. Smith v. Burbank Unified School District: Unpaid leave was a reasonable religious accommodation for an unvaccinated teacher
In Smith v. Burbank Unified School District, No. B347288 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 8, filed Oct. 7, 2026) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 3015264], the Second District (Division 8) affirmed summary judgment for a school district that placed a teacher with a religious exemption from its COVID-19 vaccine mandate on unpaid leave rather than letting him teach in person with masking and testing.
What happened
Douglas Smith, a devout Christian, taught high school chemistry and physical science for the District for roughly three decades with positive evaluations. In September 2021, as full-time in-person classes resumed during a COVID-19 surge, the District’s Board required all staff to be fully vaccinated or obtain an authorized exemption and barred unvaccinated employees from campus after October 25, 2021. About 100 employees requested exemptions on religious, medical, or other grounds, and the District granted every request, including Smith’s.
The District then treated all exempted employees the same way regardless of the basis for the exemption. Five employees in isolated office jobs—none of them teachers—were allowed to keep working with twice-weekly testing, plastic barriers, masks, and distancing. For everyone else with frequent in-person contact, including every teacher, the District concluded that unpaid leave was the only accommodation that would not impose an undue burden. Smith asked to keep teaching with masking and weekly PCR testing instead. The District denied his appeal and rejected his internal discrimination complaint.
Smith exhausted his paid leave in March 2022, went on unpaid leave, and had to pay his own benefit premiums (about $951 per month) to keep coverage. In January 2023 he took a teaching job at a school without a vaccine mandate. When the District later lifted its mandate and invited unvaccinated employees back, Smith resigned. He sued under FEHA for religious discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District.
What the Court of Appeal held
The parties agreed Smith made a prima facie case of religious discrimination. The only question under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (l)(1), was whether the District explored available accommodations and could not accommodate Smith’s beliefs without undue hardship. The court affirmed:
- Involuntary unpaid leave is not categorically unreasonable. Smith relied on the last sentence of FEHA’s religious-accommodation regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11062, subd. (a)), which says that, unless the employee requests it, an accommodation is not reasonable if it requires segregating the employee from customers or the general public. The court rejected that literal reading on this record. Unpaid leave eliminated the conflict between Smith’s religious practice and the vaccination requirement, and Smith kept the ability to return when the mandate ended. The court drew support from Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook (1986) 479 U.S. 60, which recognized that unpaid leave can be a reasonable religious accommodation.
- Undue hardship was established, and argument is not evidence. The District submitted evidence that full vaccination was the most effective way to protect students and staff, that partial reopening without a mandate had caused major operational disruption, and that accommodating unvaccinated teachers would create classroom-coverage and student-supervision problems. Smith did not controvert that evidence; his position that one more unvaccinated person on campus posed “no meaningful hardship” was, in the court’s words, “argument, not evidence.” Viewing the record in the nonmoving party’s favor does not require a court to disregard the moving party’s unrebutted evidence.
- Uniform treatment defeated the inference of discrimination. The District granted every exemption, gave every exempted teacher the same accommodation, and offered alternatives only to non-teachers without daily contact with others. With the discrimination claim gone, the derivative failure-to-prevent and retaliation claims failed as well.
Why it matters
As a published opinion, Smith gives employers defending pandemic-era vaccine-mandate cases citable California authority that unpaid leave can be a reasonable FEHA religious accommodation. But the holding is tied to its record. The court did not hold that unpaid leave is always a reasonable accommodation; it held that this District carried its burden with unrebutted evidence of hardship and applied one rule to every similarly situated employee. Employees challenging an accommodation decision need evidence—not just argument—that alternatives were feasible or that the employer applied its rules unevenly. Employers should document the interactive process, the specific hardships considered, and the consistency of their treatment across exemption types.
5. Cruz v. City of Hermosa Beach: No POBRA appeal for an officer terminated under an across-the-board vaccine requirement
In Cruz v. City of Hermosa Beach, No. B343086 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 5, filed Oct. 15, 2026, partially published) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 3093028], the Second District (Division 5) affirmed summary judgment for a city that terminated a police officer who was denied a religious exemption from its COVID-19 vaccination requirement and did not get vaccinated. Only the opinion’s Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) discussion is published. Its rulings on the officer’s FEHA and Labor Code retaliation claims are unpublished and generally cannot be cited in California courts (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115).
What happened
In September 2021, the City of Hermosa Beach required all City employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by November 12, 2021 as a condition of employment, with religious and medical exemptions available through an interactive process. Jonathan Cruz, a Hermosa Beach police officer since 2009, requested a religious exemption and met with the City manager and human resources manager. In January 2022, the City denied the request, finding it was not based on a sincerely held religious belief and, alternatively, that accommodating him would be an undue hardship. Cruz did not provide proof of vaccination by the February 19, 2022 deadline.
On February 22, 2022, the City issued a non-disciplinary “Notice of Forfeiture of Employment,” placed Cruz on paid administrative leave, and offered him a pre-separation conference. A few days later, the City learned Cruz had filed an EEOC/DFEH complaint. After a conference attended by Cruz and his lawyer, the City terminated him on March 9, 2022. It later refused his request for a POBRA administrative appeal, reasoning that the separation was a non-disciplinary forfeiture for failing to meet a condition of employment. Cruz sued for POBRA violations, retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 and FEHA, declaratory relief, and mandamus.
What the Court of Appeal held
- Published: a uniform vaccination requirement is an employment qualification, not POBRA “punitive action.” POBRA (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) gives officers the right to an administrative appeal from “punitive action,” which section 3303, subdivision (b) defines to include action that may lead to dismissal. Cruz argued that any termination is a per se dismissal under White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676. The court disagreed: White itself distinguished actions against an individual officer from situations like budget-driven mass layoffs, and POBRA’s history shows it protects officers under investigation or facing discipline. POBRA also does not regulate qualifications for employment (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556). Cruz was not fired for misconduct or poor performance; he was fired because he did not meet a minimum qualification imposed on every City employee. He had no right to a POBRA appeal.
- Unpublished: the retaliation claims failed on timing and causation. The City denied the exemption and started the separation before it learned of the EEOC/DFEH complaint, which established Labor Code section 1102.6’s “same-decision” defense by clear and convincing evidence. The FEHA retaliation claim, which targeted the denial of the administrative appeal, failed because refusing an appeal Cruz was not entitled to is not an adverse employment action. Costs on appeal were not awarded on the FEHA claim, because a prevailing FEHA defendant needs a finding that the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(6)).
- The religious-exemption denial itself was not decided. Cruz did not allege that the City acted unlawfully or with discriminatory motive in denying the exemption, and the court expressly declined to express an opinion on that question.
Why it matters
For peace officers, Cruz draws a line between discipline, which triggers POBRA’s procedural protections, and the failure to satisfy a qualification applied to the entire workforce, which does not. Earlier cases granting POBRA rights after terminations based on an individual officer’s fitness or conduct remain distinct. Read alongside Smith, the case also shows how claim selection shapes vaccine-mandate litigation: Cruz challenged the procedure and alleged retaliation, but never pleaded that the exemption denial was religious discrimination or a failure to accommodate—so the court never reached the question many employees most want answered. Employees should also note the timing problem: a discrimination complaint filed after the employer has already started the separation process will rarely support a retaliation claim on its own.
6. Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank: Strict liability applies only to harassment by the victim’s own supervisor
In Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B344642 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 4, filed Oct. 5, 2026) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 2982155], the Second District (Division 4) held that an employer is strictly liable under FEHA for sexual harassment by a supervisor only when the harasser is the plaintiff’s supervisor, acting in that capacity. A manager who supervises other employees but has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff is, as to her, a coworker—and the employer is liable only if it was negligent.
What happened
The plaintiff was a wealth advisor in Wells Fargo’s private bank. She accused Eric Pagel, a top-performing investment strategist and managing director who worked on many of her client teams, of harassing her and sexually assaulting her in her hotel room after a client dinner on a January 2020 business trip; she said she was too intoxicated to consent, while Pagel said the encounter was consensual. She mentioned harassing comments to a coworker about a month later, but that complaint was not escalated. In November 2020 she reported the alleged assault to Wells Fargo’s ethics hotline, her direct supervisor, and law enforcement. Wells Fargo put Pagel on paid leave, investigated for 10 months, found the harassment and assault allegations unsubstantiated, and issued Pagel a “final notice” for professionalism and conduct violations.
She sued for FEHA sexual harassment, failure to prevent harassment, and retaliation. She conceded Pagel was not her supervisor but argued Wells Fargo was strictly liable because Pagel supervised lower-level support staff. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding Pagel did not supervise her and that Wells Fargo took prompt and appropriate corrective action.
What the Court of Appeal held
- The harasser must be the plaintiff’s supervisor. Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)(1) does not mention strict liability; courts infer it for harassment by a “supervisor,” a term section 12926, subdivision (t) defines by a person’s authority over other employees. Reading the statutes together and following State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, the court held strict liability requires that the harasser be the plaintiff’s supervisor acting in the capacity of a supervisor when the harassment occurs. Someone who is not the victim’s supervisor cannot act in that capacity toward her.
- The rule avoids arbitrary results. Under the plaintiff’s reading, an employer would be strictly liable when a mid-level manager harasses her own boss, or when a shop foreman harasses an executive, but only negligently liable when two equal-rank coworkers harass each other—depending solely on whether the harasser happens to supervise someone else.
- Not limited to direct supervisors. The court stressed it was not holding that only a plaintiff’s direct or immediate supervisor counts. FEHA’s broad definition can make others the plaintiff’s supervisor too. But a person who supervises only other employees does not qualify.
- Older agency decisions and out-of-state law were not followed. The court declined to follow 1980s Fair Employment and Housing Commission decisions applying strict liability to all supervisors, which predated FEHA’s definition of “supervisor,” and disagreed with the Illinois Supreme Court’s contrary reading of Illinois law.
- Other theories were forfeited. The plaintiff did not argue the negligence standard on appeal, and she raised a ratification theory for the first time on appeal, so the court did not reach either one.
Why it matters
When the alleged harasser is a powerful colleague rather than the employee’s own supervisor, the case will usually turn on negligence: whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. Employees should report harassment through formal channels and document how the employer responds. Plaintiffs’ lawyers should also plead and argue every available theory—supervisor, agent, negligence, and failure to prevent—at summary judgment, because Doe lost the alternatives through forfeiture. The decision does not resolve whether the alleged assault occurred, and it assumes, without deciding, that Pagel supervised other employees.
7. McInerney v. Regents: The Fair Chance Act regulates the process, not the outcome
In McInerney v. Regents of University of California, No. B339467 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 2, filed Sept. 18, 2026) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 3059160], the Second District (Division 2) affirmed a judgment for UCLA on a job applicant’s claims under California’s Fair Chance Act (Gov. Code, § 12952) and FEHA’s anti-retaliation provisions. It held that courts will not second-guess the result of an employer’s individualized assessment of a conviction record, and that an applicant denied the full five business days to respond must still prove the violation harmed him.
What happened
John McInerney, a UCLA student in his late 60s, received a conditional offer for a student-facing office assistant job at the Graduate Student Resource Center and began working provisionally while his background check was pending. When he was taken off the schedule until the check cleared, he sent angry e-mails accusing staff of firing him for no reason and calling human resources “assholes.” The check revealed four drug convictions from 2005 to 2007. On January 5, 2022, UCLA sent a pre-adverse action letter giving him five business days to submit evidence of rehabilitation or mitigation. Instead of submitting evidence, he sent more hostile e-mails comparing staff to “witch hunters” and the Inquisition. Two days later—before the five days ran—UCLA told him he was ineligible.
The trial court ruled that UCLA properly conducted its individualized assessment, except that it cut short the five-day response period, and summarily adjudicated the retaliation claims. A jury then found that his conviction history was not a substantial factor in the decision and that UCLA would have reached the same decision even if he had received the full five days and submitted rehabilitation evidence.
What the Court of Appeal held
- The e-mails were not protected activity. FEHA retaliation requires opposition to a practice the employee reasonably believes FEHA prohibits. The Fair Chance Act expressly allows post-offer background checks and permits employers to disqualify applicants based on conviction history if they follow its procedures, so objecting to reliance on a 14-year-old conviction was not opposition to an unlawful practice. Separately, relying on Title VII cases, the court held that unreasonably hostile, demeaning communications fall outside FEHA’s protection. Even if the e-mails had been protected, timing alone could not overcome UCLA’s well-supported, legitimate reasons: the lack of any substantive response and his unprofessional conduct.
- No second-guessing the individualized assessment. The statute requires an employer to assess whether a conviction has a “direct and adverse relationship” with the job’s duties, considering the offense, the time elapsed, and the nature of the job. But the employer need not put that assessment in writing or explain its decision. The court held a court or jury may review whether the employer followed the required process, not whether it reached the right conclusion. It contrasted New York and Minnesota statutes that expressly bar disqualification absent a direct relationship. A regulatory presumption against relying on convictions seven or more years old applied only to adverse-impact challenges to bright-line policies, not to this individual claim.
- A shortened response period requires proof of harm. UCLA violated the five-business-day requirement, but the Fair Chance Act provides no statutory or nominal damages. As with other statutory torts, the applicant had to prove the violation caused him harm, and the jury found it did not.
Why it matters
For applicants with conviction records, the pre-adverse action notice is the critical opportunity: submit evidence of rehabilitation, mitigation, or errors in the report, and keep communications professional, because hostile messages can become an independent and lawful reason to deny the job. For employers, the case confirms that the Fair Chance Act is enforced through its procedures—conditional offer first, an individualized assessment, written notice, at least five business days to respond, and consideration of the response. Cutting the response period short is still a violation, even if a plaintiff must prove it changed the outcome to recover damages.
Practical takeaways
- Multistate employers: A Washington (or other out-of-state) duty station is not, standing alone, a complete defense to a CRD subpoena. California headquarters, California decisionmakers, California pay, and California ratification remain fair game for investigation.
- CRD process: Fighting a subpoena on territorial grounds requires a developed showing that the alleged unlawful practices lack sufficient California connections—not a categorical assertion that FEHA never leaves the state line.
- FEHA damages: Large noneconomic verdicts can stand on lay testimony. Remittitur still exists, but courts may not invent a “garden-variety” dollar cap.
- Arbitration: Read the clause. Agreement-only language often leaves FEHA, CFRA, and wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claims in court. See our full Morales discussion.
- Religious accommodation: Unpaid leave can satisfy FEHA when it eliminates the religious conflict, preserves the right to return, and the employer proves that alternatives such as masking and testing would impose an undue hardship. Plaintiffs must answer the employer’s hardship evidence with evidence of their own.
- Peace officers and POBRA: A termination for failing an across-the-board employment qualification, such as a vaccination requirement, is not POBRA “punitive action” and carries no POBRA administrative-appeal right. Officers challenging such a termination should evaluate FEHA discrimination and accommodation claims directly rather than relying on POBRA procedure.
- Harassment by non-supervisors: Strict FEHA liability applies only when the harasser is the plaintiff’s own supervisor acting as such. Otherwise the employer is liable only if it knew or should have known and failed to act, so a prompt complaint and a documented record of the employer’s response matter.
- Fair Chance Act: Employers must follow the statute’s steps, but courts will not reweigh an employer’s conclusion about a conviction’s relevance. Applicants should use the five-business-day window to submit rehabilitation and mitigation evidence.
If you are facing a CRD investigation, a FEHA lawsuit, a denied religious or other accommodation, a peace officer’s termination or POBRA appeal, a rescinded job offer after a background check, or an employer’s effort to force discrimination or retaliation claims into arbitration, the details of location, proof of harm, hardship evidence, and contract language matter. Contact Jonny Law to discuss your situation. This post is general information about recent California decisions and is not legal advice about any specific case.
Cases: Civil Rights Department v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., No. B346853 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 3, filed Aug. 11, 2026, pub. order Sept. 9, 2026) 2026 WL 2654677; Glick v. City of Los Angeles (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 151; Morales v. Superior Court (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 239; Smith v. Burbank Unified School District, No. B347288 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 8, filed Oct. 7, 2026) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 3015264]; Cruz v. City of Hermosa Beach, No. B343086 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 5, filed Oct. 15, 2026, partially published) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 3093028]; Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B344642 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 4, filed Oct. 5, 2026) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 2982155]; McInerney v. Regents of University of California, No. B339467 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 2, filed Sept. 18, 2026) --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- [2026 WL 3059160].
